I'm not going to pretend this is even a theory. I can't imagine how to test it. But here's ideas I have.
I'm not sure how to word this... Proto-consciousness experiences the things that happen to the particle it is a property of. Let's look at that in steps.
1) Every particle has what Skrbina called “a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.” It amounts to nothing at the level of individual particles. What I mean is, if there was a particle that possessed the property of proto-consciousness, and a particle without the property of proto-consciousness, they would be indistinguishable. There is no way to detect proto-consciousness with our senses or technologies. And just one particle doesn't have any behaviors, or a mind that wishes it could take any action. Proto-consciousness is just a building block.
2) A rock has... quite a few particles. All of which are experiencing their instantaneous memory-less moments. They are all experiencing the same thing, which isn't anything to write home about. There's nothing going on. Particles on the surface might experience more light, warmth, physical contact with things that are not part of the rock, and other things than particles in the interior are experiencing. But they aren't doing anything. There is no information processing. No processes of any kind. Not even any movement relative to each other. I suppose erosion is a process that the exterior experiences but the interior does not. But all in all, there's not enough going on to raise "instantaneous memory-less moments" up to something more.
3) This is from Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:
The simplest hypothetical mind would have one sensor and one doer. That's it. But I guess such a mind doesn't exist. (At least they can't find one.) The simplest existing mind is that of the archaea. It has two sensors (molecules of sensory rhodopsin) and two doers (flagella).A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.
Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•A sensor that responds to its environment
•A doer that acts upon its environment
Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the body’s health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.
A mind, then, is defined by what it does rather than what it is. "Mind” is an action noun, like “tango,” “communication,” or “game.” A mind responds. A mind transforms. A mind acts. A mind adapts to the ceaseless assault of aimless chaos.
Archaea "is an example of a molecule mind, the first stage of thinking on our journey. All the thinking elements in molecule minds consist of individually identifiable molecules."
Archeae moves toward light. Compared to a rock, that's a significant thing. Different parts of the critter are doing different things. I'm not knowledgeable enough of definitions to know if this is considered information. The rhodospin changes its shape in different degrees of light, "which triggers a cascade of molecular activity that activates the" flagella. It isn't "trying" to move toward the light. It doesn't "know" it is doing so. There is no intent. Still, it is acting because of something that exists at a distance from itself. It gained information that something exists out side itself. But even if I'm stretching the definition of information too far, there is a good deal of stuff going on. Many particles are experiencing many different things. A big step up from a rock.
Is it all that different from a thermostat? Or a tiny machine that we might make that acts exactly like the archaea?
4) Journey of the Mind is a very cool book. It moves up several stages of mind-complexity. It compares things like the history of cities with consciousness. It speaks about Stephen Grossberg, who I had never heard of, but seems to be an amazing person. I would like to know more about the steps between the stages of complexity that are discussed, but I can understand the need to keep the book at a manageable size. The problem is, without those between steps, I'm not able to follow it. It seems pretty important to discuss, for example, the stages of development of neurons.
Regardless, I don't know at what point actual consciousness is present. How many activities, or different activities, or different kinds of activities, must be present in one clump of matter that acts as a single unit (henceforth referred to as an entity) before it has subjective experience, and there is something it is like to be that entity? Nagel chose the bat because we literally cannot imagine what it's like to be a bat, experiencing the world through echolocation, flying, and catching bugs while flying to eat. OTOH, it's a mammal like us, with a neo-cortex like us, so we might reasonably think it has subjective experience; that there is something it is like to be a bat.
But how far down the evolutionary ladder can we go before there is no longer something it is like to be that entity?
I don't know the answers to those questions, but I think information is key.