What is Consciousness?

[Patterner]

I suppose it makes sense to talk about this. In this forum, we can talk about it from a panpsychist pov. Dennett can post whatever he wants in the Not Panpsychism forum.

I think Nagel does a good job of it in What is it like to be a bat?

Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there may even (though I doubt it) he implications about the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism.

(I bolded the last sentence.)

There is nothing it is like to be a rock. Not from the rock’s point of view. Because the rock doesn’t have a pov. It has no subjective experience. Things simply happen to it.

I think there are a couple main aspects of consciousness. At least human consciousness. The first is just what Nagel says. Subjective experience.

The second is awareness. I see different levels of awareness. At least two or three, depending. The first is possibly the same thing as subjective experience. I’m not sure if I think they are different things. A worm might have subjective experience. There might be something it is like to be a worm. Maybe we need to go a little higher on the evolutionary ladder before we all agree that there is subjective experience. But, at whatever point we agree there is a minimal degree of subjective experience, are we likely to think the creature is aware of its experience?

Next is awareness of self. Although I assume the actions of any entity reflect the fact of the distinction between the entity and everything else, I don't suspect all conscious entities are aware of the distinction. I think a degree of intelligence is required for this awareness.

Next is awareness of awareness. Certainly it’s possibly to be aware of experiences, and aware of self, but have no inkling of your own awareness. I think this level of awareness most clearly shows that there is a relationship between awareness and intelligence.

In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers says a theory of consciousness, needs to explain two things:

That is, consciousness is surprising. If all we knew about were the facts of physics, and even the facts about dynamics and information processing in complex systems, there would be no compelling reason to postulate the existence of conscious experience. If it were not for our direct evidence in the first-person case, the hypothesis would seem unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps. Yet we know, directly, that there is conscious experience. The question is, how do we reconcile it with everything else we know?
........:

A second target is the specific character of conscious experiences. Given that conscious experience exists, why do individual experiences have their particular nature? When I open my eyes and look around my office, why do I have this sort of complex experience? At a more basic level, why is seeing red like this, rather than like that? It seems conceivable that when looking at red things, such as roses, one might have had the sort of color experiences that one in fact has when looking at blue things. Why is the experience one way rather than the other? Why, for that matter, do we experience the reddish sensation3 that we do, rather than some entirely different kind of sensation, like the sound of a trumpet?

In The Feeling of Life Itself, Christof Koch discusses properties of consciousness. I won’t quite the several pages, but he ends with:

In summary, every conscious experience has five distinct and undeniable properties: each one exists for itself, is structured, informative, integrated and definite. These are the five essential hallmarks of any and all conscious experiences, from the commonplace to the exalted, from the painful to the orgiastic.

I'll have to read it at least a few more times.

[Patterner]

A poll at The Philosophy Forum got me thinking about something. (And wondering just how out there my thinking is getting.) The part I'm thinking about is the evolution of consciousness.

Let me start with the characteristic of height. I would say things evolve to have greater height, which is selected for for various reasons. To get out of reach of things. To reach things that are too high. Whatever other reasons. But (and this is the maybe crazy party, but maybe not if I can find the words to explain what's in my head) I'm thinking it's not height that's evolving. Height is a characteristic, with a spectrum of possibilities. (0 to infinity?) Rather, the life forms are evolving to have greater height. For that matter, non-living things become taller for various reasons. Height is always available in various degrees. You have whatever degree you have because various particles are arranged in the ways they are.

Consciousness is the same situation?

[Dime]

The question “what is consciousness” has an implicitly stated assumption, that is, “how does matter give rise to consciousness?”

So when you ask that question you necessarily add that assumption.

Maybe we shouldn’t assume that the relationship between matter and consciousness is one of a one way causal relationship.

What if instead, we instantiate consciousness as the substrate upon which matter occurs.

The question of what is the relationship of matter to consciousness becomes like that of the image on a screen, with matter being like the image.

The screen doesn’t need the image to appear for it to exist.

[Patterner]

I was thinking more asking the lines of: What are the characteristics of consciousness? The definition of Consciousness, famously, depends on who you ask. I'm wondering why we can agree on at least one or two characteristics.

I believe I understand what you're saying. I don't object to the idea. I believe the relationship between matter and consciousness is casual in both directions. I discuss that in the first (so far only) post of my Proto-Consciousness thread. But it's all speculation. I'm just trying to come up with an idea that's consistent. If you can talk slow, I'd like to hear more.

And thanks for posting!

[Dime]

I was thinking more asking the lines of: What are the characteristics of consciousness? The definition of Consciousness, famously, depends on who you ask. I'm wondering why we can agree on at least one or two characteristics.

I believe I understand what you're saying. I don't object to the idea. I believe the relationship between matter and consciousness is casual in both directions. I discuss that in the first (so far only) post of my Proto-Consciousness thread. But it's all speculation. I'm just trying to come up with an idea that's consistent. If you can talk slow, I'd like to hear more.

And thanks for posting!

I see what you are asking.

To me the characteristics of consciousness are firstly, it has some differentiated characteristics, that is, upon any given sensory field, it will have at minimum two states, that is on and off.

But, that’s not to say that consciousness is necessarily binary, but maybe more like a dimmer switch with a minimum detection threshold.

Secondly, consciousness has the characteristic of intentionality, which can also be referred to as “aboutness”, so what appears is like a kind of reference to something else which. Can be inferred, for example, a red blob appearing in vision is inferred to be an apple.

So, we have form and we have name.

The two need to be associated together in order for any sensory content to be conscious.

But thirdly, they need to appear to something. Thankfully that is already present in consciousness itself, however the organism needs something more permenant and corporeal to assign as itself, and so the perception of the body becomes the self to whom sensory stimuli appear.

For example, if I see a red blob but have absolutely no implicit mental concept of what that blob might be, it won’t be consciously perceived.

It may still be able to induce behaviour, but that behaviour will be more automatic, for example the sucking reflex in babies when they see a nipple.

But from the point of view of a conscious being, the universe is perceived from the inner self.

From that point of view, consciousness can attempt to understand itself.

When consciousness attempts to do this, it begins from the assumption that it is the organism, I.e. the body.

However, at some point it might realise that from its point of view the body is perceived, yet, consciousness feels to be something internal to that perception, the thing viewing that perception.

It’s understanding of itself then becomes more panoramic, interwoven in it’s own substrate, yet completely imperceptible.

The more it tries to penetrate this formless characteristic of itself the more it realises it is ungraspable, like trying to catch a cloud with a net.

But I digress, I find it hard not to go all the way to the bottom.

[Patterner]

To me the characteristics of consciousness are firstly, it has some differentiated characteristics, that is, upon any given sensory field, it will have at minimum two states, that is on and off.

I don't know what you mean. It seems you are explaining how characteristics of consciousness come about, before saying what the characteristics are. Am I misunderstanding?