Are panpsychists the only true physicalists?

[Guest]

Only the physical is real. Only the physical is causally effective. Physicalism best explains the technological success story of modern science. Science works. The existence of subjective experience (the so-called Hard Problem of consciousness) is a problem for physicalism only if one makes a metaphysical assumption, namely the intrinsic nature of the world's fundamental quantum fields differs inside and outside one's mind. The principle of mediocrity dictates otherwise. Yes, biological minds are special, but they are not ontologically special. Non-psychotic phenomenal binding into virtual worlds of experience, not experience per se, distinguishes awake animal nervous systems from the rest of physical reality.

This conjecture is sometimes called constitutive panpsychism - to be distinguished from property-dualist panpsychism. Constitutive panpsychism may also be called non-materialist physicalism. The entire mathematical apparatus of modern physics may simply be transposed to an experientialist ontology. I don't know if non-materialist physicalism is true. Its big advantage is consistency with the empirical evidence and answers to all the staple questions of academic philosophy of mind.

[davidpearce]

(apologies, "Guest" above is me; I had teething problems posting)

[Patterner]

Glad to see the real you! Welcome, First of Posters! Must make a badge for you.

When it comes to most of this stuff, I am but an egg. Not sure of what you're saying in some regards. I'll read it some more times and try to figure out what I think of it. In the meantime, hopefully, some others who know more than I do will respond.

[panpsychism]

I have no idea what y'all are on about. However, I can think of something that contradicts this:

Only the physical is causally effective.

The placebo effect.

[Patterner]

I have no idea what y'all are on about. However, I can think of something that contradicts this:

Only the physical is causally effective.

The placebo effect.

Indeed. I imagine many people have discussed it. But one that springs to mind is an article called Why Epiphenomenalism is Almost Certainly False, by Emerson Green:

The placebo effect and other examples of psychosomatic effects suggest that mental phenomena constrain neural phenomena. (At least in some cases. But we would only need one such case to refute epiphenomenalism.) The philosopher Patrick Spät made this argument from psychosomatic effects in his paper, A Pill Against Epiphenomenalism. So let’s run through a couple examples of the placebo effect.

In a randomized placebo study conducted by J. B. Moseley and his team, 180 patients with osteoarthritis of the knee were divided into three groups. The first two groups actually underwent minimally invasive surgery, but the third group did not: the surgery was only simulated for the third group, and measures were taken to thoroughly deceive them. Placebo medications were administered, operation noises were simulated, and staff behaved as if there was a real surgery taking place. Moseley’s results: the outcomes of the operated-on patients were no better than those who received the placebo surgery.

The placebo effect creates quite a puzzle for epiphenomenalists. What else would have caused the disappearance of the pain but mental states? That’s the most straightforward interpretation. It might not be the only coherent interpretation, but it’s clearly the most natural and straightforward way to interpret the placebo effect.

One might object that perceived pain is not the best example. We want to see brain states change as a result of mental states. So take another example. T.D. Wager published the following in 2004:

“In two functional resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments, we found that placebo analgesia was related to decreased brain activity in pain-sensitive brain regions, including thalamus, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex …”

So patients were given a placebo, and brain activity decreased in regions associated with pain. That seems to be a pretty straightforward example of the mental causing a change in brain activity. The placebo effect clearly suggests that in some cases, mental phenomena constrain neural phenomena.

I have no idea what y'all are on about.

But you're damned handy at building websites. . Everybody, this is our webmaster, or whatever the title is.

[bert1]

Only the physical is causally effective.

This is interesting. I've been wondering for a while if all causation is mental, or reducible to mental causes. By mental I mean conscious. Everything does what it does because of how it feels, and how it values those feelings, is the idea. This is one solution to the problem of overdetermination - what we think of as mechanical causation (e.g. billiard balls) is reducible to the feelings of the entities involved (whatever they are). Forces are intentions, conceived of from the inside. Needs a lot of work and a fuller explication.

[panpsychism]

But you're damned handy at building websites. . Everybody, this is our webmaster, or whatever the title is.

LOL

Technically I didn't build it, I just happen to know which buttons to push (and where) to make it assemble itself out of the ether.

Anyway, personally I'm a megalomaniacal Zen Solipsist with leavenings of nihilism and existentialism. Take from that what you will.

[Patterner]

Only the physical is causally effective.

This is interesting. I've been wondering for a while if all causation is mental, or reducible to mental causes. By mental I mean conscious. Everything does what it does because of how it feels, and how it values those feelings, is the idea. This is one solution to the problem of overdetermination - what we think of as mechanical causation (e.g. billiard balls) is reducible to the feelings of the entities involved (whatever they are). Forces are intentions, conceived of from the inside. Needs a lot of work and a fuller explication.

That's amazing. Later tonight, I will post a very big post about my take on many things. One of them is pretty much what you just said. I have some ideas, which are all just speculation. Nevertheless, there’s no other explanation yet, so I’m running with it!

[Patterner]

But you're damned handy at building websites. . Everybody, this is our webmaster, or whatever the title is.

LOL

Technically I didn't build it, I just happen to know which buttons to push (and where) to make it assemble itself out of the ether.

Anyway, personally I'm a megalomaniacal Zen Solipsist with leavenings of nihilism and existentialism. Take from that what you will.

What I take from this is that you’re a figment of my imagination. Which means I built this site all by myself. Good for me! I’m going to give myself a raise!

[Patterner]

Non-psychotic phenomenal binding into virtual worlds of experience, not experience per se, distinguishes awake animal nervous systems from the rest of physical reality.

Can you tell me what this means? I don’t know what “non-psychotic phenomenal binding” is. Also not sure if “awake animal nervous systems” is different from “animal nervous systems,” or if that’s just the way you worded it.